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Economic crisis, the financialization of real estate and the neoliberal restruc-
turing of cities have affected households and provoked citizen mobilizations 
in cities around the globe (Aalbers 2008; Brenner et al. 2012; Jacobsson 
2016). Disparities between rich and poor are particularly salient in the hous-
ing sphere. Nevertheless, housing is also a field in which multiclass alliances 
have been emerging in various parts of the world (Mayer 2013; Polanska 
2016). This chapter explores relationships between contextual factors and 
emerging solidarities as well as antagonisms in mobilizations around hous-
ing in two Central and Eastern European capital cities: Bucharest and Buda-
pest; both Hungary and Romania are among the European Union countries 
most severely struck by housing deprivation and overcrowding (Vincze 
2017). The main focus is on the period after the 2008 crisis, which involved 
new developments in national policies in both Hungary and Romania, with 
profound impact on social relations and power structures.
Although both countries were severely hit by the financial crisis, its im-
pacts on the housing sphere were different. Hungary experienced a severe 
mortgage crisis, with a high number of failed mortgages followed by evic-
tions (Bohle 2014). This effect of the crisis was thematized politically both 
by the government and by social protests. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
Hungary’s economy, including its banking and housing sector, was trans-
formed by a new supermajority government, the policies of which aimed 
at creating protected capital circuits for national capital. Since 2015, Hun-
gary has experienced a new boom in housing prices, housing investment and 
mortgages, driven by newly nationalized banks, domestic savings and state 
subsidies for housing mortgages. Meanwhile, housing continues to consti-
tute a main factor of social polarization.
Housing precariousness in Romania has grown ever since 1990, in the 
context of national policies favoring housing privatization and restitutions 
and/or reprivatization of formerly nationalized properties. This process in-
tensified in the years after the 2008 crisis, as the state not only withdrew 
from social housing provision but also limited the amount and accessibility 
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of social benefits. After 2009, Romania experienced severe cuts in wages, 
social benefits and employment, leading to an increased burden on housing 
costs and overcrowding, followed by evictions. At the same time, especially 
after the crisis, policies, such as rehabilitation programs for privately owned 
apartment blocks, the continuous sale of public housing, state- backed pri-
vate mortgage programs and deregulations in urban planning, benefited 
mainly the better- off and stimulated large real estate developments. In this 
process, evictions and symbolic cleansing of the poor became emblematic – 
the most visible housing conflicts accompanying property restitutions in 
gentrifying urban central areas.
The financial crisis exacerbated previous social inequalities in both coun-
tries, affecting especially poor rural areas in Hungary, and poor areas at the 
edge of larger cities in Romania. The effects of the crisis were used by var-
ious configurations of power ambitions on the part of political actors and 
local and international capital and evoked a range of citizen mobilizations.
In this chapter, we investigate housing contention in Bucharest and Buda-
pest after 2008, based on the authors’ original research and secondary ma-
terials on housing movements, housing markets and legislation. We analyze 
housing struggles in the two cities in the context of post- socialist transfor-
mation and post- crisis economic development to see how such economic and 
political conditions shape opportunities and/or constraints for  movement- 
 building, oppositions and alliances. There are examples of emerging multi-
class alliances between middle- class and poor strata (including those struck 
by housing debt after 2008) in both cities (Florea 2016; Udvarhelyi 2010) and 
antagonisms and conflicts of interest between various groups. As expected, 
ethical considerations regarding urban politics vary widely across this land-
scape, evoking not only new- leftist solidaristic mobilizations but also con-
servative, neo- nationalistic ones and a continuously changing landscape of 
alliances and divergences. Our focus of attention is on the antagonisms and 
solidarities produced across different positions within mobilizations around 
housing since 2008. We draw on Crossley’s (2006, 2013) “field of contention” 
notion to account for this complexity of housing contention and the way 
in which it is structurally produced. We propose that, rather than singling 
out certain actors, the whole field within which these actors emerge and 
meet each other needs to be considered. We argue that structural aspects of 
housing relations are relevant in understanding the alliances, solidarities, 
antagonisms and conflicts in the field of housing contention, as well as the 
ideologies and political values emerging within the dynamics between dif-
ferent actors in this field.
A field of contention approach
Ever since Castells’ seminal work, it has been argued that urban prob-
lems are particularly conducive to cross- class alliances, as they typically 
affect – albeit to various degrees – all classes, such as environmental or 
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transportation problems (Castells 1983; Mayer 2013). However, previous re-
search has also highlighted the difficulties in achieving mobilizations across 
class divides or among groups with different social backgrounds or interests 
(Florea 2016; Lichterman 1995; Rose 2000). Differences in the social posi-
tionality of activists, ideological differences and movement cultures, as well 
as competition for resources, have been identified as factors impeding the 
formation of coalitions (Lichterman 1995; Staggenborg 1986). Nevertheless, 
previous findings highlight that exceptional environmental conditions, such 
as an economic crisis, may cause organizations and groups to set aside ide-
ological differences (Borland 2010; Staggenborg 1986).
Many of these studies of movement coalition tend to assume a rationalist 
framework, conceiving coalition- or alliance- building as a deliberate strat-
egy that groups or organizations embark on when it serves their interests – 
as aptly illustrated in the title of Van Dyke and McCammon’s (2010) edited 
book Strategic Alliances.
However, the activist groups we focus on herein do not necessarily form 
alliances based on a common agenda or joint strategy; yet, they are all part 
of an increasingly dense field of contentious action around housing. Thus, 
we need a theoretical approach that can conceptualize both the antago-
nisms and solidarities in urban mobilization, allowing us to capture a wider 
spectrum of scenarios, such as the formation of cross- group solidarities, the 
failure of such attempts and the parallel mobilization of different groups in 
the same social- structural context.
For this purpose, we draw on Crossley’s (2006, 2013) understanding of 
social movements as “fields of contention,” which “draws our attention to 
the numerous groups and agents who interact within the internal space of a 
‘movement’ and to the relations, alliances and conflicts between those vari-
ous groups/agents as they unfold through time” and “draws our attention to 
the embedding of social movement struggles within multiple differentiated 
contexts of struggle, each of which affords different opportunities for strug-
gle but each of which makes different demands upon activists if struggle is 
to prove effective” (Crossley 2006, 552).
This approach recognizes emergent properties and field dynamics with-
out making strong assumptions about common understandings among the 
actors. Moreover, it is as much interested in the unintended consequences of 
field dynamics as in the conscious actor strategies. More than Crossley, but 
consistent with his approach, we stress the structural factors that formulate 
the conditions of group formation and struggle, thus returning to the un-
derstanding of social movements as part of long- term structural processes 
(Castells 1983). However, structural processes do not translate directly into 
values or ideological positions but rather form the conditions that actors 
face and, on the basis of which, may try to act to change their situation. 
Our field of contention approach is one that recognizes both structure and 
collective agency, complex historical constellations as well as the role of fac-
tors and events beyond the local in shaping actors’ problem thematization 
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and alliances. We conceive of structural factors as elements of the field of 
contention that both produce the conflicts around which contention arises 
and influence relationship- making among actors, by both enabling and con-
straining collective action.
In thinking about how structural processes translate into movement for-
mation and relationships of solidarity or antagonism within the movement 
field, we wish to preserve the heuristic value of social movement research 
tools focusing on the constitutive process of a movement and combine it with 
an attention to actors’ positions within the structural process. We conceive 
the constitutive process as happening not only within a movement or its 
strategic/intentional interactions but also through the structural conditions 
of the field. How do actors’ positions within long- term processes converge 
at a certain moment of mobilization? How do long- term political cleavages, 
national policies or economic crises influence movement groups’ opportu-
nity structures for alliance- making? Asking such questions, we propose to 
investigate the constitution of movement politics and alliance structures as 
part of a field of contention conceived as a historical social process.
Structural contexts of housing contention
Consistent with our structural approach, in this section, we discuss inter-
twining structural factors that create the conditions for housing needs and 
insecurities and for movement formation.
Socialist housing construction and distribution in both Hungary and Ro-
mania followed long- term patterns of social and geographical hierarchies 
along urban and/or rural, industrial and/or agrarian priorities. The dis-
tribution of different types of public housing (state- built and nationalized 
apartments) followed the hierarchy rank in redistributive power (Konrád 
and Szelényi 1979). Most of the population in rural areas was excluded from 
central housing policies (Misetics 2017a) or offered bank credits rather than 
state housing.
After 1989, under the influence of international financial institutions such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the pri-
vatization of state housing aggravated the inequalities of previous distri-
bution and propelled spatial segregation (Günter 2000). Meanwhile, falling 
incomes and surging unemployment coincided with bringing energy costs 
to world market prices and decreasing public expenditure for housing ben-
efits (Misetics 2017a, 268), which induced increased household utility costs 
(Bohle 2014, 117). The combined effect of rising unemployment, housing 
pressures and the disbandment of workers’ homes led to a visible growth in 
homelessness. Until recently, housing policies tended to favor construction 
and ownership (available to middle and upper strata) over housing costs 
benefits that could prevent housing and energy poverty.
In Hungary, those hit by poverty were squeezed into urban segregated 
neighborhoods or further out from the cities, migrating toward rural areas 
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and often turning their small privatization gains from selling their apart-
ments in the city (which they could not sustain) into hopes of existence in 
cheaper locations. The rural areas they headed to, however, often turned out 
to be long- term repositories of unemployment and growing poverty.
In Romania, one of the first laws in 1990 facilitated the right to buy in 
state- built apartments. In 1995, tenants living in nationalized dwellings 
were also allowed to purchase them, often coming into legal conflict with 
the property restitution claimants. Moreover, under European Union acces-
sion pressure, the Romanian government passed the Law 10/2001, speeding 
up property restitutions to former owners. These privatization mechanisms 
fueled the real estate market and structural dispossessions. Roma tenants 
were disproportionally affected following long- term histories of housing 
inequalities.
In Hungary, after the first government of present Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán (1998–2002) initiated a program of state- aided housing loans bene-
fiting the upper 20% segment of the income scale (Misetics 2017a, 275–6), 
the following socialist government reduced those subsidies and channeled 
housing mortgages toward foreign currency loans. A forex mortgage boom 
followed (largely in Swiss francs) and changes in currency rates were exter-
nalized to households. Following the global financial crisis in 2008, between 
2008 and 2009, households’ debt service on forex loans grew between 30 and 
60% (IMF 2012), coupled with a new wave of unemployment and income 
decrease. In the face of the economic crisis, the socialist government took an 
IMF loan and implemented further cuts, including housing subsidies (Bohle 
2014, 21).
In 2010, Fidesz, the conservative party, entered parliament with a super-
majority. It started a program to tackle forex mortgage debts, framed within 
a larger program labeled as a national economic freedom fight against for-
eign capital (Wiedermann 2014). Building on the delegitimization of the 
foreign direct investment- and credit- led economic policies of the previous 
socialist and liberal parties, Fidesz stepped up ideologically into the sym-
bolic role of the representative of national interests against Western powers.
The problem of debt spirals due to forex currency rate changes was miti-
gated due to the government’s forex emergency package. Nevertheless, debt 
service rates of indebted households remained high in comparison to the 
rest of Europe. With no subsidies for tackling household maintenance costs 
and debts, the situation resulted in a further growth of household debts, 
evictions and homelessness (Misetics 2017a). While Fidesz made the de-
crease of household utility costs a central theme of its 2014 election cam-
paign, the distribution of these subsidies was, in fact, hierarchical, with 
larger users acquiring bigger benefits. The most important housing policy 
package of the post- 2014 cycle followed a similar distribution scheme, al-
locating funds only to families who could afford down payments for new 
homes. Since 2015, a new housing investment boom has been driven by re-
nationalized banks, domestic mortgages and mortgage subsidies, favoring 
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national capital (in construction and finance) and the better- off layers of 
society. While the Fidesz government criminalized homelessness through 
the Constitution, 4,000 households were expected to be evicted in 2018 due 
to failed mortgages.
The launch of the first private mortgage program in Romania after 2002 
corresponded with the advancement of the real estate boom. At the same 
time, local authorities refused to allocate budgets for social housing, while 
engaging in selling their properties on the market. This was especially the 
case for Bucharest. The real estate market peaked in March 2008. During 
the first crisis year, prices fell by 41%. In response, the Democratic Party gov-
ernment launched the state- backed mortgage program called “Prima Casă” 
(First Home) in 2009, in collaboration with several major banks. The main 
beneficiary group was the young and aspiring middle class. Although this 
category generally benefited from the socialist housing distribution (through 
housing support passed on by the previous generation), it aspired to higher 
benefits from privatization, expecting jobs generated by foreign direct in-
vestment and access to Western- like urban development. The program’s im-
mediate effect was the stabilization of the real estate market, limiting the 
dramatic drop in prices. That same year, the government took a loan of 20 
billion euros from the IMF, the European Commission, the World Bank and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, conditioned by 
austerity measures and structural readjustments, involving administrative 
decentralization, the flexibilization of labour contracts, the expansion of the 
health system privatization, tax cuts for companies. In the last few years, 
the transnational creditors have been pushing for a diminishment of home-
ownership policies to enhance the corporate rental market and to make way 
for large rental developments. In this context, housing precarity affects 25% 
of the population; impoverished tenants are not sufficiently protected by 
law, thus being evicted from restituted properties, private rentals and public 
housing units. They are pushed into informal housing at urban peripheries, 
“tolerated” until real estate interests appear in the area and push them even 
further out (Vincze 2017).
Antagonisms and solidarities around housing 
mobilizations in Budapest
The most politicized aspect of housing privatization in Budapest was the 
appearance of urban homelessness. Coalitions between mobilizations by 
homeless people and experts and/or activists had a significant role in the 
establishment of an official system of homeless shelters and in shifting the 
issue of homelessness from policing to the sphere of social policy (Csongor 
2010). In the 2000s, social worker activists funded the organization “Man on 
the Street,” with the aim of breaking the issue of housing poverty out of the 
existing frames of charity, homeless shelter infrastructure and social policy, 
thematizing it instead as a political issue concerning all citizens and exerting 
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pressure to legalize the right to housing (Udvarhelyi 2010). In terms of cross- 
 class coalitions, an important step was taken in 2009 when homeless activ-
ists and activists of Man on the Street founded the organization “The City is 
for All.” Their aim was to transcend the structural inequalities ingrained in 
society that silence the poor and to create an organization where manage-
ment and leadership roles are held by homeless people (Udvarhelyi 2010).
The interclass coalition between “affected” and “ally” members became 
the group’s central organizational and political characteristic. One illustra-
tive group policy is that only homeless members can represent the group 
publicly. While people living in housing poverty can become members af-
ter attending three meetings, middle- class “allies” can become members 
only by invitation. Similar measures are applied to compensate for mate-
rial aspects of volunteer work by homeless members. The group cultivates 
a sense of consciousness regarding the potential dominance of middle- class 
activists within the group (Misetics 2017b, 406–7). The City is for All pro-
poses its own model of advocacy as an alternative to paternalistic and non- 
 participatory models of social policy.
Since 2009, The City is for All has become one of the most influential 
activist organizations in the post- crisis waves of progressive activism. Uti-
lizing a conscious policy of coalition- making and media communication, it 
continues to link the issue of homelessness to other forms of social oppres-
sion (participating at demonstrations linked to lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender rights and to those linked to the Roma minority’s role in the 
1956 revolution) or aspects of housing inequalities (organizing the “Vacant 
Buildings March,” which links the issue of homelessness to wider issues of 
financial speculation and irresponsible housing policy). Actions of The City 
is for All address various scales and actors of local or national politics, from 
nationwide issues, such as the criminalization of homelessness, to issues on 
local governmental level, such as evictions.
After 2008, a wave of debtors’ mobilizations reacted to the forex mort-
gage crisis in a neo- nationalist political framework and produced a stream 
of housing activism different from that practiced by The City is for All. 
Organized typically in the form of small core groups with a strong personal 
leadership and hundreds to thousands of followers through social media, 
debtors’ initiatives framed debt service to banks as a fight between financial 
exploitation and society defined as the Hungarian nation. Debtors’ actions 
ranged from petitions and lawsuits to street occupations and picketing of 
banks or government institutions. While the biggest demonstrations were 
centered in Budapest, the groups were also based and acted in smaller cities.
Members of these groups can be characterized as excluded from the fa-
vors of all mainstream housing policies. Szabó (2018) notes that forex debt-
ors’ families acquired homes relying on state loans and self- building during 
socialism. This implies that they did not receive any of the benefits of hous-
ing privatization. For them, the 2000s mortgage boom appeared as a new 
chance to acquire housing. However, members of debtors’ movements were 
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not among the people who could benefit from this chance in the long- term. 
They became endangered by mortgage failure and evictions after debt ser-
vice skyrocketed in the aftermath of 2008. As the Fidesz government’s res-
cue packages were targeted to better- off families, these families remained 
outside the scope of government help. At the same time, the government 
campaigns’ symbolic narrative that vindicated the role of savior to the Hun-
garian people against foreign banks effectively muted the voices of those 
still under pressure.
The groups’ criticism against economic exploitation turned against 
Fidesz as the latter’s economic policies benefiting national finance capital 
continued. The members claimed that an alliance with banks was behind 
the government’s mortgage rescue. In 2013, debtor activist groups demon-
strated in front of Viktor Orbán’s home. In 2016, they demonstrated in front 
of the house of Sándor Csányi, president of the Hungarian OTP bank, to 
emphasize the conflict between debtors and the biggest Hungarian bank’s 
benefits from the government’s mortgage solution package.
In terms of their protest repertoires and symbolic discourse, debtors’ 
movements carried forward the tradition of right- wing protests from 2006. 
Barricades, square occupations, slogans combined with national symbols, 
cars or small lorries covered with those symbols, and daily protest news 
were also features of protests in 2006 that were ridiculed by the (then dom-
inant) liberal media. The protesters’ discourse featured an eclectic mix of 
legal and financial technical critique of the forex lending practice, political 
arguments referring to justice and civic rights, and historical and mythical 
images about the Hungarian nation taking back control over its history. 
Ignored by studies focusing on protest culture and civil society similar to 
Western progressive models, these repertoires were a result of previous dec-
ades of right- wing counterculture, spread throughout the lower levels of the 
cultural industry (like pocketbooks sold on train stations, summer festivals 
or the rise of “national rock”).
Despite the mainstreaming of many of this subculture’s claims and sym-
bols by the electoral success of the extreme right party Jobbik and by the 
politics of the Fidesz government, the complex subcultures of the New 
Right have seen a relatively autonomous development from these bodies, 
even after 2010. In the case of debtors’ movements, these repertoires have 
been turned against Fidesz. From the position of parliamentary opposition, 
the right- wing party Jobbik made gestures in support of debtors’ groups. Its 
criticism of Fidesz’ measures to save debtors fit into the party’s strategy to 
build its political campaign on a radical right framing of the social tensions 
aggravating since 2010. From the part of debtors’ movements, however, 
Jobbik received criticism for “vote extortion,” referring to the idea that the 
party seems to deliver electoral promises rather than standing up directly 
for the interests of debtors.
Debtors’ groups formed an alliance called the “Debtors’ Chamber” for 
the 2018 parliamentary elections. They formulated 12 points/demands for 
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solving the situation of mortgage debt and invited opposition parties to 
sign them. Despite getting support from multiple opposition parties, this 
strategy remained unsuccessful due to another one of Fidesz’ supermajority 
mandates.
If The City is for All’s political goal is to conceptualize and put into 
practice the political equality between homeless and unaffected members, 
debtors’ groups organize to protect themselves from the threat of becoming 
homeless. For the latter, this means not only the loss of the home but also 
the loss of all other characteristics of what they see as basic conditions of a 
“normal” life: a family, access to a regular income, integration into social 
systems, such as healthcare and education. This difference in structural po-
sition was added to political differences when members of The City is for All 
considered alliances with debtors’ groups. Despite both streams of activism 
being oriented against the same structural processes of housing deprivation, 
The City is for All soon decided not to collaborate with debtors’ groups. On 
the one hand, this was due to ideological differences, as The City is for All 
considered debtors’ groups’ views on hierarchy, gender or antisemitism un-
acceptable to them. Another cause was that homeless members of The City 
is for All experienced an explicit exclusion of their persona and their prob-
lems when debtor groups maintained that they represent homeless people.
We see a field of contention in the situation described above where, on 
the one hand, there is little ideological difference between debtors’ activist 
groups and state power, but there is a strong contradiction in their material 
positions and interests. On the other hand, despite the fact that both debt-
ors’ groups and The City is for All address housing problems caused by the 
same structural processes and policies, there is no collaboration between 
these groups due to the way housing problems become politicized along dif-
ferent social positions, alliances and political traditions. Finally, beneath 
the politicized movement groups, there are individual stories of conflicts, 
most of which do not become visible in public debates. Activists of the left- 
 wing housing rights group The City is For All observed that the way such 
stories come into contact with movement actors – whether individual fam-
ilies threatened by debt and eviction reach out to progressive or right- wing 
movement groups – is largely a matter of chance, as both The City is for 
All and debtors’ groups are very small compared to the volume of housing 
problems across the country.
(Un)making solidarities around housing mobilizations 
in Bucharest
Characteristics of the field of housing contention in Bucharest are the lack 
of politicization of homelessness, the politicization of evictions in the frame 
of antiracist and Roma rights mobilizations, and fluctuating solidarities and 
antagonisms with other “discontented” mobilizations, such as the right to 
the city, the heritage protection movement and, specific to the post- crisis 
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period, the anti- corruption movement. Since 1989, the most politicized as-
pect of housing transformations has been the massive and persisting evic-
tion process associated with housing restitutions of buildings nationalized 
in the 1950s. This process intensified in the early 2000s after changes in the 
national legislation facilitated restitutions to prewar owners, their heirs or 
buyers of their legal rights. As most of the formerly nationalized buildings 
were located in central areas, with rising land value, and as most of their 
dwellers were impoverished former state tenants, including many of Roma 
ethnicity, the restitution process generated (violent) evictions without relo-
cations, gentrification and increasing inequalities between the new class of 
owners and former state tenants.
At that time, the strongest Roma rights organizations raised a critical voice 
against evictions that affected Roma dwellers disproportionately (Fleck and 
Rughiniş 2008). The involvement of Roma advocacy organizations as actors 
in the field of housing contention was framed within the wider antiracist 
struggle beyond the local context. Moreover, the intensified evictions at-
tracted the interest of a new generation of critical urban researchers, such as 
those around the Association for Urban Transition (organized in 2001), and 
Ofensiva Generozităţii (founded by theatre and arts students in 2005–2006). 
These young educated groups, with a marginal position in the Romanian 
intellectual world, initially pushed for a progressive social change in urban 
policies and more visibility for themselves in the public discourse.
The early 2000s saw the parallel emergence of several actors in the field 
of housing contention. In mid- 2006, Ofensiva Generozităţii initiated a com-
munity art project in Uranus- Sabinelor, a micro- neighborhood close to the 
city center, stigmatized as a Roma neighborhood, marked by numerous 
restitutions of previously nationalized houses and by imminent evictions. 
Several self- organized new- leftist groups came into alliance with Ofensiva 
Generozităţii, giving support to the area’s remaining dwellers who gradu-
ally self- organized as the La Bomba group (later a formal association). All 
these groups and organizations allied in 2006 with other anti- hate-speech 
organizations to collectively organize a 250- people-strong antiracism 
 manifestation – which illustrates the centrality of antiracist solidarity for 
urban contender groups in the early 2000s.
In early 2007, many of these groups formed the Platform for Bucharest, 
under the coordination of the Association for Urban Transition, which 
published a declaration for a better city with claims ranging from heritage 
protection to better housing conditions. Different groups concerned with 
urban issues showed adhesion to the claims in the declaration and joined 
the Platform. The alliance- building process developed around a loose ideal 
of a better city and was fueled by the desires for social change coming from 
diverse small “discontented” groups mostly not directly affected by deepen-
ing (re)privatization policies.
Before the local elections of spring 2008, the Platform worked to pro-
mote a policy document to guide Bucharest’s booming urban development 
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ethically. The local elections in 2008 corresponded to the start of the crisis 
and the dramatic fall of real estate prices. The following years were marked 
by frequent episodes of contention organized around the Platform for Bu-
charest. In mid- 2009, certain protests were gathering more than 200 people 
and online groups had thousands of supporters. At that time, hierarchies 
among movement groups within the Platform became increasingly une-
qual, limiting access to resources and discursive legitimization. Positions 
of different movement groups varied according to professional status, level 
of education, age, class and access to more powerful social networks, with 
housing rights activists being less powerful. Under the pressure of the more 
powerful groups, the Platform’s prioritized claim became the protection of 
architectural heritage against demolitions for new high- rise real estate de-
velopments. Most of these buildings with heritage value were also formerly 
nationalized buildings, now restituted or in the process of restitution.
The already precarious tenants of such buildings (mostly Roma) were in-
creasingly labeled in the movement’s internal and public communications as 
the destroyers of heritage value, while the impoverished in need of afforda-
ble housing were accused of ignorance regarding the cultural value of cer-
tain urban areas. The movement’s initial cross- class alliance was breaking 
apart. The initial ideal of “the right to the city” was losing symbolic ground 
in front of a new vision: a competitive “city of culture” with historical iden-
tity embodied in its architectural heritage (Florea 2016).
Right- wing nationalist groups have strengthened within the Platform and 
within the growing heritage protection movement since 2010. Consequently, 
several initial supporters of the Platform have distanced themselves from 
it. Using the movement’s frame, base and discursive legitimization, a new 
political platform was building up, later growing into Save Romania Union 
(Uniunea Salvați România) – the second most powerful political party in 
Bucharest.
In parallel, La Bomba’s community center was evicted in 2011 following 
property restitution. This was an important event in the process of politiciza-
tion around housing rights. Media attention sided with the  evictees – which 
rarely happens. They also received support from those who previously par-
ticipated in La Bomba community actions. Moreover, the locals managing 
La Bomba became even more involved and radical in their critique of hous-
ing policies, expressed in street protests sometimes gathering more than 100 
people, press releases, requests for official meetings at the mayor’s office, 
and in two collaborative theatre plays developed together with socially in-
volved artists.
After the crisis, evictions from formerly nationalized buildings became 
emblematic for the making of solidarities and antagonisms in the field of 
housing contention. In the spring of 2012, a Roma family informally living 
in a recently restituted villa, administrated by a well- known member of the 
heritage protection movement, was evicted. The family’s removal from this 
property in the city center was legitimized through their replacement with 
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young artists who would establish as a cultural collective (Florea and Dumi-
triu 2017). Critical debates arose within several left- wing groups dedicated 
to issues of social justice. These debates intensified the antagonism between 
the heritage protection movement and the emerging alliances mobilizing in 
the field of housing, the latter becoming more articulated in their housing 
justice claims.
Since then, an increased level of interactions and alliance- building among 
tenants at risk of eviction, artists, academics, anarchist self- organized 
groups, Roma rights activists and NGOs have animated the field of hous-
ing contention. In this context, Frontul Comun pentru Dreptul la Locuire 
(The Common Front for Housing Rights, FCDL) was established in 2013. 
The FCDL was organized as a non- hierarchical group of people at risk of 
eviction and those working to advance housing justice – a cross- class coali-
tion viewing housing precariousness in capitalism as a concern of the many. 
They have a loose network of about 2,000 supporters and its activities ad-
dress various scales, ranging from the local (offering assistance with filing 
social housing applications at the municipality’s housing administration de-
partments) to the national (pushing for changes in the housing legislation) 
and international (actions of international solidarity and exchange).
Another violent eviction occurred in a restituted complex of buildings in 
Vulturilor Street, in the center of Bucharest, in the fall of 2014, which affected 
more than 100 people. The previous contact between the displaced tenants 
and the FCDL allowed the organization of a strong and visible opposition. 
The level of cross- class and multiethnic solidarity and alliance- building 
around the Vulturilor eviction case was unprecedented in the field of housing 
contention in Bucharest, involving actors ranging from wider Roma rights 
organizations to even members of the heritage protection movement. As in 
previous emblematic eviction cases, the politicization of the groups involved 
increased, in this case through protests initiated by evictees, meetings with 
municipal, parliamentary and ministerial decision- makers, reaching out to 
more people at risk of eviction, and activating the solidarity of some hith-
erto unpoliticized NGOs, such as those offering direct harm reduction and 
medical assistance to people affected by homelessness.
However, cross- class alliances and solidarity building in the field of hous-
ing contention reached a limit in 2015, when massive urban protests against 
corruption failed to address social issues and excluded any association with 
FCDL claims (Voicu 2017). Massive protests in late 2015 were sparked off 
in the aftermath of a deadly fire in a Bucharest music club. Mass media ac-
counts and public debate arose around the corrupt authorities’ guilt when 
it comes to, for example, the (lack of) appropriate spaces for cultural events 
and ensuring building safety in the city. Public rage was enhanced by the 
meritocratic presentation of some of the fire victims as young middle- class 
professionals. In this frame, the FCDL supported the protests, with an 
emphasis on the precarious lives of club workers (also among the victims) 
and the need for safe buildings in the city, especially housing. However, its 
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messages of cross- class solidarity were not adopted by the protests, whereas 
Save Romania Union, with its urban professional image and its focus on 
protecting buildings, gained visibility and stronger influence.
Anti- corruption protests sparked off against the recently installed PSD 
(Social Democratic Party) government in January 2017. These were the wid-
est and most publicized protests in the last two decades, gathering more 
than 200,000 protestors in Romanian cities for several months and chal-
lenging and affecting national political dynamics. At the same time, an il-
legal eviction of about ten Roma and non- Roma families was facilitated 
by the municipality in the city center in February 2017, while massive anti- 
 corruption protests for justice system reform were taking place not far away. 
The call for solidarity initiated by the FCDL and its Roma rights alliances – 
 highlighting evictions, housing injustice and economic inequality as impor-
tant anti- corruption claims – was ignored by the movement groups.
This failed alliance illustrates an ideological difference. Despite challeng-
ing the same public authorities, anti- corruption protestors (some identifying 
with Save Romania Union) are advancing their own claims for more  Western- 
 modeled development, while ignoring social justice and housing justice claims. 
Similar to the previous heritage protection protestors, they claim to represent 
the entire just society, thus silencing the critical voices of the housing move-
ment. This failed alliance, as well as the previously broken “right to the city” al-
liance, also indicates a field of contention where members of different contender 
groups occupy different structural positions. Interestingly, the anti- corruption 
protestors organize against a government actually favorable toward the 
 middle- and upper- classes. Despite benefiting from the last few decades of ur-
ban development, privatization and housing policies and being less vulnerable 
to post- crisis transformations, this recently organized “discontented” urban 
middle- class advances its interests even further, while rejecting alliances with 
the “deprived.” On the other hand, cross- class solidarities around the FCDL 
and alliance- building with other movements and groups (feminist Roma, new- 
 leftist, harm reduction) continue to develop at the intersection of ideological 
affinities, unintended outcomes of participation in community and movement 
events, personal contacts and differently vulnerable structural positions.
Conclusion
This chapter addressed what we conceptualize as the field of contention 
over the issue of housing in Bucharest and Budapest, focusing specifically 
on how structural processes shape actors’ positions and mutual relations 
in social struggles over housing and how their ideologies and actions inter-
vene into this field. Following up on Crossley’s (2006, 2013) proposition to 
think movements within a field of contention that comprises multiple levels 
of struggles, including unintended consequences and factors not reflected 
consciously, we proposed that tracing movement formation and mutual 
relations together with structural factors that formulate the conditions of 
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ideological and strategic formation of activist struggles has a strong contri-
bution potential to understanding urban movements.
Our field of contention approach allowed us to see how mobilizations 
may take unintentional directions (such as the split in “the right to the city” 
movement in Bucharest), are absorbed by wider power struggles (such as 
the anti- mortgage mobilization’s critique being absorbed by governmental 
discourses in Hungary and the heritage protection movement in Bucharest 
being absorbed by gentrification processes) and mobilize around similar is-
sues with opposing political logics (such as the right- wing anti- mortgage 
mobilization versus “housing for all” approaches in Budapest), all within 
the boundaries of the same overarching structural factors.
The cases discussed illustrate that attention to processes beyond short- term 
local movements is necessary for understanding how structural and political 
factors interact in a complex field of contention. In addition to contemporary 
policies and struggles on local and national levels, housing conditions in both 
countries are shaped by long- term processes of localized structural integra-
tion into the dynamics of financial markets and global competition. 
Therefore, to properly understand how mobilizations (don’t) shape 
around the issue of homelessness in our cases requires attention to such 
long- term processes, involving the downgrading of social housing and wel-
fare services, the marketization of housing after 1989, the mortgage crisis in 
Hungary as an effect of housing financialization, respectively urban policies 
aiming to attract investment at the price of evictions in Bucharest.
We suggest that a field of contention perspective is useful for understand-
ing actors’ positions, politics and alliances, solidarities or conflicts within 
the present field of housing contention. Our analysis showed that relation-
ships between actors in various social positions vary widely. We focused par-
ticularly on the relationship between middle- class political mobilization and 
those threatened by housing poverty. While the Hungarian group The City 
is for All and the Romanian Common Front for Housing Rights are built ex-
plicitly around cross- class alliances between those positions, contradictions 
between the positions, interests and political stances of actors in different 
positions become salient in other cases. Such was the case of the lack of 
support for those suffering evictions during a massive wave of middle-class 
demonstrations in Bucharest, or the case of the parallel activity of right-
wing and left-wing housing activists in Hungary, who work on structurally 
similar issues but find it impossible to work together. In parallel, the herit-
age protection movement and the housing movement in Bucharest, although 
initially allied against real estate investors’ power over urban development, 
split into antagonistic political positions, both trying to widen their niche in 
the dominant discourse and to penetrate the level of national politics.
A field of contention approach, informed by an investigation of historical 
structural processes within which movement actors operate, can provide a 
more complete understanding of movement formation and intra- movement 
alliances, solidarities and antagonisms, as it considers movements’ own 
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ideas, strategies and alliance- making together with parallel or “silent” ele-
ments of the field and relates the characteristics of field relationships to the 
positions of movement actors within structural processes. Our case stud-
ies of Bucharest and Budapest housing struggles showed that similar local 
problems induced by global processes provide a foundation for a process 
of movement formation that results in a landscape of groups with various 
political views, organized in complex patterns of alliances, solidarities 
and antagonisms. Rather than seeking a linear connection between broad 
structural process and movement response, we take the investigation of the 
complex relationships between localized forms of structural process, social 
positions of actors and the historical making of movement ideologies and 
alliance structures to be a key task in understanding the relationship be-
tween housing problems and housing movements today.
Note
 1 The authors’ names are in alphabetical order. This research is funded by the 
Swedish Research Council FORMAS (contract 2016- 00258_3).
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